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Chapter Thirty-two 
 
 
Skill Formation 
 
Irena Grugulis 
 
 
 
Skill has always been a central element of industrial relations.  In Britain many of the 
early trade unions and friendly societies formed around skilled trades, to negotiate on pay 
levels, the differentials available for skill or experience and the forms of skill 
development available (see, for example Thelen 2004; Penn 1984; Cockburn 1983).  Skill 
affects the way work is designed and organised and influences, or stems from, the levels 
of power, discretion and autonomy that workers have over work processes (Turner 1962).  
It is also a key aspect in the way that firms, industrial sectors and nations compete.  
Indeed, high skills have the potential to both raise wages and improve firm and national 
competitiveness (Culpepper 2001).  Unsurprisingly then, what skills are formed, how 
they are developed and the way they are exercised in the workplace is a matter of key 
interest to all parties in the employment relationship. 
 
It is also an area of enduring variation between nations with systems of skill formation 
and employment relations often differing dramatically from country to country (Whitley 
1999; Crouch, Finegold and Sako 1999).  Nations vary greatly in the extent that they rely 
on the general education system, provide specialist publicly-funded or subsidised 
vocational education and training (VET), or rely on individual firms to offer programmes 
and continuing development.  Such differences seem to be stable; despite the rhetoric on 
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globalisation there seems to be little sign of convergence between states.  Korea remains 
different to the USA and France’s system is not the same as that in Hungary.  Nor do 
these differences in vocational training occur in isolation.  Rather, each is embedded in 
systems of institutional structures and relationships, managerial strategies, market 
relations and national systems.  Indeed, it is likely that these structures make the 
differences between the various systems of skill formation meaningful.  After all, once a 
skill has been learned it must be put into practice in the workplace so the markets in 
which a firm competes, the way managerial authority is exercised and the discretion that 
is allowed to workers are all likely to be highly influential.  According to Whitley (2003) 
there are five key elements in these differences (p. 680): 
 
• the extent and nature of the state’s co-ordinating role in economic development, 
• the organisational basis, and particularly the cohesion of business associations, 
• the strength of the market for corporate control 
• the organisation and effectiveness of the public training system 
• the extent and form of labour market regulation 
 
Ashton (2004) describes this far more concisely as the relationship between capital, 
labour and the state.  Both of these authors are careful to emphasise that the skills that are 
developed and exercised depend on many more factors than the relative vocational 
education and training practices.  Job design, employment security and inter-firm 
relations (among others) will influence and be influenced by the way firms compete, their 
ownership structures and the trust and authority that is delegated or withheld. 
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Accordingly, this chapter seeks to present various different skill formation systems in 
their national and institutional settings.  It starts by describing practices in three very 
different systems: the USA, Japan and Germany; noting particularly the nature and role 
of state involvement, the extent to which decisions are left to individual firms and the 
legacy of VET that exists; before exploring the reasons for the differences observed and 
considering the relative advantages and disadvantages of each system.  It then focuses on 
the firms themselves and the choices they make (since firms within the same sector can 
and do make very different choices about the skills they require from, and are prepared to 
develop in, their workers).  Finally it considers the impact that trade unions have on skill 
formation in both regulated economies (where unions are often pivotal and 
institutionalised elements of the system) and market ones (where individual firms choose 
whether or not to recognise a union presence). 
 
The USA 
 
In the USA there is little state involvement in learning and the system of vocational 
education is market-led and decentralised (Rubery and Grimshaw 2003).  Almost all 
decisions on skills development are taken by individual firms or workers with little 
involvement from public institutions.  Some states regulate particular industry sectors but 
this intervention is being abandoned rather than extended, as in the construction industry.  
Such a withdrawal of influence does little to encourage investment, indeed, training 
levels have slumped in the states which have deregulated, as has investment in physical 
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capital and productivity (Bosch 2003; Crouch et al. 1999).  One brief attempt to devise 
national skill standards never got off the ground (Ashton 2004).  In the absence of 
nationally recognised qualifications most learning is by doing, quality is uneven and 
provision polarised.  Workers who are not already qualified to degree level are unlikely 
to receive firm-sponsored training and, when they do, the opportunities they are presented 
with are often narrowly based, while firms complain that much of their training spend is 
remedial.  Many organisations rely on outside training providers or immigration to supply 
them with skills (Rubery and Grimshaw 2003).  By contrast, employees who are already 
extremely highly educated may benefit from extensive (and expensive) provision (Crouch 
et al. 1999). 
 
At firm level high turnover and low wages (the USA is the only developed economy 
where wages have actually fallen over the last twenty years (Green 2006), make investing 
in skills unattractive.  But as Crouch, Finegold and Sako (1999) point out, this seems to 
be a deliberate strategy rather than a pre-determined feature of the labour market.  
Organisations that seek to reduce turnover (by offering greater job security, linking pay to 
performance and involving employees in decision making) are generally successful.  Yet 
these are, and remain, a minority.  It seems that most US firms would rather treat labour 
as a variable cost, preserving numerical flexibility when demand slackens.  Despite this, 
the USA enjoys both high capital productivity and reasonably high labour productivity in 
most sectors and is particularly effective at producing highly skilled elites in financial 
services, aero engineering, entertainment, biotechnology and software.  But the 
exceptional performance of those with most skills effectively conceals a far less 
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impressive average performance and a wide distribution of skills, which is growing yet 
wider.  More recently too, US job growth has been achieved by trading off skills against 
employment. 
 
Japan 
 
Japan, like the USA, leaves VET decisions and activities to individual firms (state 
intervention took the form of encouraging large firms to develop, post war, then giving 
them free rein internally, Thelen 2004) but while companies are free to decide their own 
strategies and set their own training standards both skill formation and employment 
practices are very different to those in the USA.  In Japan, large ‘institutional companies’ 
provide workers with employment security and put a great deal of effort into encouraging 
active social engagement and identity with the firm (Dore and Sako 1989; Sako 1999; 
Keizer 2005).  A high proportion of young people stay on in general education and this is 
then reinforced by a remarkable and extensive system of continuing education and 
development once in employment.  Skill formation is broad and extends to the majority 
of the workforce (Cole 1992).  One study, cited in Crouch, Finegold and Sako (1999) 
calculated that the average Japanese firm provided newly recruited assembly workers 
with 310 hours of training, Japanese-owned subsidiaries in the USA offer 280 hours 
while US plants provide only 48 hours. 
 
This in-company training is key since some of the initial skills of Japanese workers 
compare poorly with those in Britain and Germany (particularly among engineering 
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graduates).  This formal learning is rarely accredited (since workers may expect to stay 
with one firm for most of their working lives) but is supplemented by extensive on-the-
job training.  Flexibility is ensured by moving workers between departments which has 
the added advantage of providing skills development beyond the traditional functional 
silos so materially assisting workplace problem solving.  Since pay and promotions are 
heavily based on seniority, workers have further incentives to stay with the same 
employer and are not penalised for abandoning their specialism and learning new skills 
(McMillan 1996; Cole 1992).  
 
Germany 
 
In Germany the lynchpin of German VET is its rigorous system of three year 
apprenticeships, which are long established in the old West Germany and were extended 
to the East after unification, a process which, as noted below, was not without problems.  
These are designed by consensus with input from employers’ associations, trade unions 
and educationalists and costs are shared between all parties to the employment 
relationship (including the apprentices who accept a wage set at about a third of the adult 
wage for the duration of their studies, Crouch et al. 1999; Streeck et al. 1987; Rubery and 
Grimshaw 2003).  Time on the programme is split between formal taught courses in 
colleges and on-the-job learning, generally structured around a series of problem solving 
activities that become progressively more challenging.  Apprentices are taught by Meister 
(master craftspeople) who are both qualified experts in their occupation and still actively 
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practising so workplace innovations are incorporated into the programme (Culpepper 
1999; Lane 1987, 1989). 
 
This intensive and highly regarded preparation for work is supported by low turnover; 
employee involvement both directly in work design and process and indirectly through 
the trade unions and works councils; and comparative employment security once 
employees are in work.  The state is involved in supporting apprenticeship but also, more 
directly, by regulating employment far more closely than do national governments in 
either the USA or Japan.  Because such regulation makes labour more expensive, it 
provides an incentive to employers to use it differently (Streeck 1992).  Lane’s (1987) 
study of the banking and insurance industries shows how automation was used to 
eliminate almost all the low skilled jobs.  Other tasks were combined in a way that 
retained (and occasionally raised) skill levels, including a greater focus on customer 
service.  In Britain, by contrast the introduction of technology in banks resulted in work 
being standardised with 91 per cent of clerks and 50 per cent of supervisors doing 
deskilled work (Crompton and Jones 1984:61). 
 
These three systems develop skills in very different ways, supporting dramatically 
different levels and distributions of skills in the economy.  The USA, as noted above, is 
highly successful at producing small numbers of expert elite workers, Reich’s (1991) 
‘symbolic analysts’ who compete against the best in the world, but in the process average 
and low-skilled workers are (often badly) neglected.  In Japan, male workers in large 
firms receive continued and extensive skills development on- and off-the-job and the way 
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those skills are learned ensures a competence that is very broadly based.  While in 
Germany about two-thirds of the workforce are qualified to intermediate level in 
vocationally relevant skills (Bosch 2003; Steedman 2001).  In the workplace these skills 
are harnessed to workplace innovations. 
 
These variations stem from a range of different choices made by states, employers and 
occasionally trade unions on a range of factors including the form and nature of state 
intervention, the relations that exist between firms, the way those firms compete and the 
product markets they compete in.  These are worth exploring in more detail since they 
help to reveal both the depth of variation in the different systems and something about 
their relative prospects for the future. 
 
Accounting for differences 
 
Voluntarism and Regulation 
 
A key aspect in all skill formation systems is the role played by the state.  This can be 
voluntarist (also known as liberal or market-based) or regulated (educational).  The 
central assumption in a voluntarist system, as is broadly the case in the USA and Britain, 
and is that businesses operate most effectively when unfettered by regulation and that 
they are best placed to assess their own skill needs and react to changes as the market 
dictates.  Competitive pressures will ensure businesses remain responsive and offer 
suitable training.  The government’s role is to minimise intervention and ensure that 
 9 
appropriate legal and other frameworks are in place to facilitate the free play of market 
forces. 
 
Alternatively, in regulated systems, governments may take the view that skills 
development is a public good, that it is in everyone’s interest to have a highly skilled 
population but that, left to themselves, individual businesses will be unable or unwilling 
to invest sufficiently in the long-term skills of their employees.  Indeed, where a 
competitive market exists between firms, it may be rational for them to choose not to 
train since there is no obligation on their competitors to invest similar amounts of money 
and skilled workers may be poached by other firms.  So activities that make sense at firm 
level effectively sabotage a sector or economy’s chance of up-skilling.  It then becomes 
the state’s task to provide such skills or ensure that systems are in place which will 
guarantee that business provides them. 
 
Regulation may take a variety of forms, in particular the state can supply the necessary 
skills directly or put systems in place to ensure that businesses invest in development.  
Taiwan and Denmark provide interesting examples of both of these approaches.  Both 
economies are dominated by small and medium sized enterprises (which are far less 
likely to train and develop workers than their larger competitors) and in both nations the 
state has intervened to ensure that VET takes place and that activities are of high quality 
but these interventions take very different forms.  In Taiwan extensive technical and 
vocational skills were introduced into the education system.  Despite the fact that most of 
the demand was for (high status) academic courses, and that these would have been 
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cheaper to provide, the Taiwanese government invested extensively in the education of 
scientists and engineers.  Access to academic courses was officially restricted, more than 
half of school-children were channelled into technical training and, at university level, 
more courses were made available for scientists and engineers and new Institutes of 
Technology launched.  Student numbers, textbooks and curricula were state controlled 
and this meant that Taiwan succeeded in both increasing the numbers of low-cost 
industrial products for export and also managed the transition from this to higher value-
added production across many if not all sectors without significant reported skills 
shortages (Green et al. 1999a).  In Denmark, a long legacy of strong and collaborative 
trade unions meant that workplace learning programmes could be set centrally (by both 
employers and unions) to ensure high standards and consistency, while state subsidy 
provided for a high uptake by firms and apprentices (Ashton 2004).  Elsewhere, state 
imposed levies and ‘licences to practice’ for particular occupations help to ensure high 
skills and high competence.  In France, employers are required to support training or pay 
a levy of 1.5 per cent of turnover plus an apprenticeship tax of 0.5 per cent of turnover to 
the state.  While in Austria, Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands there are systems 
of extensive and rigorous apprenticeships which attract high proportions of young people 
entering the labour market (Steedman 2001). 
 
Both voluntarist and regulated approaches can be successful.  Regulation is particularly 
effective at ensuring that large sections of the working population acquire a broad range 
of vocationally relevant skills while Finegold’s (1999) work in Silicon Valley 
demonstrates how this intensely competitive labour market can support a ‘high skills 
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ecosystem’.  Silicon Valley is famously the site of a cluster of extremely high-tech 
computing firms.  These are supported by the proximity of universities (University of 
California campuses in Berkeley, San Francisco, San Diego and Los Angeles and private 
institutions such as Stanford, USC and CalTech) that supply expert labour, share research 
and stimulate start-up companies.  Stanford (whose graduates include William Hewlett 
and David Packard) even set up the first university science park to provide fledgling 
firms with support services.  The infrastructure is conducive to growth with good local 
transport, an international airport and a state-of-the-art telecommunications system while 
the availability of venture capital, low levels of regulation and limited penalties on 
bankruptcy encourage start-ups.  These small and often highly focussed firms, prosper 
through inter-dependency forming partnerships with other organisations and participating 
in employer groups to pursue initiatives such as improving technical training in city 
colleges, that are to their mutual benefit.  Individuals also collaborate through 
professional associations, continuing education courses and alumni associations.  In firms 
there is little formal training but skills and expertise are developed through project work 
on cutting edge technical challenges.  Even labour mobility, a point of concern elsewhere, 
assists knowledge diffusion here and increases personal and professional networks.  
However, these two ways of operating are successful at different activities and, with the 
very notable exception of Japan it is difficult to find an example of a market economy 
which provides high quality skills development for the majority of the workforce. 
 
Such inactivity presents voluntarist economies with a dilemma.  Most support high skills 
competition with other nations and believe this can best be achieved by market means, 
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leaving firms unregulated so that the fittest survive to compete internationally.  Yet in 
practice this lack of intervention may result in low-skills competition (Finegold and 
Soskice 1988).  Not only is such activity less desirable than knowledge-based, high skills 
competitiveness, since the margins earned are likely to be narrower; it may also, outside 
person-to-person services which are not readily sent off-shore, be a finite strategy for the 
developed world as India and China provide increasing access to cheap, highly skilled 
labour.  When the hourly labour costs in inland China are 41 US cents an hour and those 
in Sri Lanka 40 US cents an hour (Freeman 2005) it is difficult to imagine how the 
developed world will compete on labour cost alone.  In Britain and Australia this 
dilemma has resulted in extensive official intervention to encourage and exhort 
employers to provide more skill development (Buchanan, Watson and Briggs 2004; 
Hampson 2004; Keep and Mayhew 1999; Keep and Stasz 2004).  However, these 
campaigns are often based on the assumption that the problem is one of information, that 
once firms know how positive VET can be and what programmes are available they will 
invest in workforce skills.  Yet, there is no evidence to suggest that non-training firms do 
not appreciate the potential advantages that training can confer (quite the contrary, as 
shown in Matlay 1998).  It may be, as noted above, that not training is a rational, 
economic decision.  Moreover, interventions tend to be targeted only at the supply of 
skills, so this widespread activity does little to address the fact that firms may still 
compete on the basis of unskilled labour.  More worryingly, by exempting employers 
from responsibility for VET, these interventions may mean that governments get stuck 
with both the role of skills provider and the need to subsidise the private sector, and all in 
the name of voluntarism (Keep and Ashton 2004; Felstead, Gaillie and Green 2002). 
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Both voluntarism and regulation are simplifications.  Few nations are prepared to 
completely abandon the idea of all economic intervention and even regulated states will 
not legislate for every activity.  The dominance of the market in the USA does not 
preclude the extensive (if variable) mass education system (Whitley 1999) and many of 
the most highly skilled are selected on the basis of their achievements here or actively use 
their academic qualifications in the workplace (Estevez-Abe, Iversen and Soskice 2001).  
The British and Australian governments intervene extensively in attempts to improve the 
supply of skills (Keep and Ashton 2004; Buchanan et al. 2004).  German apprenticeships 
provide high quality and widely recognised qualifications for young people but, after that, 
much continuing development is as ad hoc and variable as in market economies 
(Culpepper 1999).  Moreover it is difficult to apply either label to Japan.  Large firms are 
certainly given a great deal of freedom by the state to decide whether, when and what 
skills to invest in, but limited labour mobility ensures that their investments are far safer 
than those made by firms in other nations and it took extensive and active state 
regulations for earlier generations (including insisting on official approval for firms 
hiring experienced workers, approval which would only be granted with the consent of 
their previous employer) to limit this mobility (Thelen 2004).  This extensive employer-
provided training is also limited to the large firms and (generally) the male employees.  
Kondo’s (1990) account of the experiences of women and marginalised workers presents 
a very different picture of working life in Japan.  Nonetheless, despite these reservations, 
it is still useful to know the extent to which states are market led or regulated, particularly 
over issues of skill formation since it is here that many will intervene. 
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Competitive and Co-operative Relations 
 
Another key area of difference is in the relations that exist between firms.  In Japan there 
are strong collaborative inter-firm networks.  Some of these are drawn together on a 
regional or craft basis but most are created and maintained by large corporations.  Unlike 
large US firms, which may have thousands of suppliers, used for one-off contracts or 
switched when a price advantage is seen elsewhere even the largest Japanese firms will 
have only a few hundred suppliers, but their (tiered) relations with these are generally 
close and stable.  Members of networks provide high quality, just-in-time supply closely 
tailored to the needs of the central organisation with products adapted to suit changes in 
demand where necessary.  In return they receive security of contract and long-term 
partnership.  Such close and sustained links mean that firms do not have to renegotiate 
contracts and prices every time an order is placed and processes, financial arrangements 
and management systems are often open to supply chain partners for collective discussion 
and improvement.  Since the members of networks are also linked to one another they 
may combine to purchase expensive plant or equipment or help redistribute work when 
deadlines are tight while their central organisations are likely to invest in developing 
suppliers’ skills or providing technology or expertise.  Trust is strengthened and 
maintained by the fact that effort goes into keeping personal, as well as institutional, ties 
within the network with managers in the whole supplier community encouraged to 
socialise together and to develop and maintain friendships (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995; 
Crouch et al. 1999; Whitley 1999; Dore and Sako 1989). 
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In Germany links tend to be sectoral, rather than supply-chain based.  Wage bargaining is 
still conducted sectorally with employer associations negotiating for all their members.  
Because of this, there is less incentive for newly qualified apprentices to gain a premium 
on their salary by moving employers (Rubery and Grimshaw 2003).  Such collective 
agreements also mean that firms do not compete by slashing wages and prices.  
Chambers of Commerce rigorously police apprenticeship programmes to ensure that 
companies are not exploiting trainees or exempting themselves from the obligation to 
provide training, and that all provision is of high quality.  This intervention is tolerated 
since the chambers are controlled by the employers themselves and they also provide a 
basis for sharing information on good practice; firms may come together to fund joint 
projects, invest in R&D or develop specific workplace innovations.  Sanctions against 
firms that fail to train range from formally removing apprentice training powers or 
depriving them of access to technology transfer networks as well as (widely used) more 
informal deterrents (Culpepper 1999). 
 
In each of these networks the desire to be competitive drives firms to improve their 
products, enhance the performance of every member of their supply chain or invest in 
research and these positive reactions are fostered by the institutional structures, the 
expectation (and reality) of long-term collaboration and close personal friendships 
between key workers.  They are key elements in the success of VET provision and 
collaborative inter-firm developments.  As Culpepper (2001) points out in his account of 
changes to youth training in France and the introduction of the apprenticeship system to 
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East Germany after unification, many of the problems these interventions experienced 
could be directly attributable to weak employer associations.  Such collaborations are not 
confined to nations that are “institutionally dense” (Ashton 2004).  Networks do exist in 
Silicon Valley and the Los Angeles concentration of multi-media companies (Finegold 
1999); they may be created around Japanese transplants abroad (Brown 2001a); 
supported by state and local authority initiatives (Edwards et al. 2002); or grow around 
strong employer associations (Grugulis, Vincent and Hebson 2003).  But they are far 
more rare in market-based economies where contracts respond largely to price.  Indeed, 
in the USA, legislation actively discourages collaborative inter-firm activities so shared 
interests generally result in mergers or competition (Whitley 1999).  In market systems, 
when small supplier firms adjust their processes to suit their larger customers there is no 
promise of contractual security (Blyton and Turnbull 2004; Rainnie 1988) and no 
expectation that developments will be mutual or gains shared.  Some may be, albeit 
unequally but competition may also be zero sum with firms competing to drive others out 
of the market and small firms vulnerable to exploitation and insolvency. 
 
These institutional links extend to the way firms are funded.  Mutual shareholdings in 
Japan and long-term bank investment in Germany ensure that organisations are supported 
on a long-term basis (Rubery and Grimshaw 2003).  In the USA and Britain, where many 
large firms are publicly quoted, shareholders are far more likely to demand short-term 
performance.  To the extent that, as Cappelli (1995) notes, redundancy programmes result 
in share price gains.  Given the links noted elsewhere between job security and 
investment in skills it is easy to see why such regular rounds of ‘de-knowledging the 
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firm’ have been criticised (Littler and Innes 2003).  As Lloyd (1999) demonstrates in her 
comparative study of the British and French aerospace industries, making skilled workers 
redundant during economic downturns (the option taken by the British firms) meant that 
they were far less well equipped to take on orders when conditions improved.  More 
broadly, co-operative and collaborative relations between firms may encourage trust-
based relations within them.  Such collaboration may take very different forms.  In 
Germany and Denmark for example it is common for employees to be involved in issues 
of job design and work process (Ashton 2004), works councils and trade union 
representatives have a formal role in management and consultation has a statutory basis 
(French 2001).  In Japan, where work processes tend to be designed in detail, little 
worker input is expected but a great deal of effort is put into securing participation in 
detailed problem solving activities (Whitley 1999).  By contrast, in the market 
economies, even where formal consultation mechanisms exist there is far less evidence of 
constructive collaboration on workplace problems. 
 
Products and product markets 
 
The markets that firms choose to compete in are also significant since these have a key 
influence on the skills that are developed and the way they are used.  Large numbers of 
standardised products mass produced require very different forms of labour to 
customised, small batch, high quality or innovative products.  Thelen (2004) points out 
that, since US companies have access to a large and reasonably homogeneous domestic 
market many went into mass production early, deskilling workers and selling large 
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numbers of standardised goods.  In Germany, by contrast, an emphasis on quality, 
customised service and products in all areas of the economy creates a very different 
demand for and supply of goods.  It also involves a very different way of organising 
labour.  Mason, Van Ark and Wagner’s (1996) detailed study of biscuit manufacturing 
shows how German firms concentrated on producing small batches of high quality 
foodstuffs with 90 per cent of the workforce skilled bakers and most concentrated in 
areas of production which would add value, such as decoration or adding fillings to the 
biscuits (as compared to British mass produced simple biscuits where most labour was 
unskilled).  German workers were able to take on more tasks, with one worker often 
monitoring several production lines and accepting responsibility for quality (indeed, such 
a concern is an integral element of pride in the occupation or Beruf).  Similarly, the 
German and Dutch construction sites studied by Clarke and Wall (2000) had higher 
numbers of skilled workers, fewer managers and far fewer faults reported than their 
British counterparts.  Indeed repeated comparative studies of a range of different 
industries and services show that German firms employ more skilled workers and pay 
higher wages but that those workers are far more productive, take more individual 
responsibility for quality and work very differently to their counterparts elsewhere.  
Moreover, when work is reorganised or new technologies introduced the priority for 
automation is to eliminate low skilled jobs and the remaining tasks are recombined in 
ways that often increase skills still further (Finegold, Wagner and Mason 2000; Jarvis, 
O'Mahoney and Wessels 2002; Lane 1987). 
 
Firm level choices 
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National systems of skill formation, employment and business are important.  They 
provide the institutional and regulatory structures against which firms operate and they 
are, as noted above, comparatively stable.  Yet the existence of these structures does not 
mean that choices at firm level are irrelevant nor that every organisation is a mirror image 
of all its compatriots.  The choices that firms make: to enter certain markets and withdraw 
from others; to compete on quality or compete on cost; to hire and fire workers as orders 
are lost and won or to multi-skill them so that they can contribute at all levels of the 
production process; are all important and all have implications for skill formation.  The 
emphasis in all of these is on choice.  As will be seen below, certain decisions make it 
more likely (or more rational) for organisations to invest in training but such choices are 
not pre-determined since employment practices do not arrive as pre-formed templates, to 
be ‘read off’ once decisions have been taken on products or strategies.  Different firms 
can and do choose to enter the same market or adopt the same technology in very 
different ways (Boxall and Purcell 2003; Ashton and Sung 2006). 
 
One choice that firms make is the market in which they compete and the products or 
services they compete on.  Mason et al.’s (1996) study of biscuit manufacture, considered 
above, shows the links between such strategies and skills; high skill levels are generally 
associated with a high value added product strategy (Mason 2004).  Arthur’s (1999) study 
of US steel mini-mills reinforces this.  When production focussed on small batches of 
different products workers’ skills were an integral part of the process since the 
changeover between batches could be complicated.  Firms engaged on large production 
 20 
runs, by contrast, required far less input and far fewer skills of their workers (who simply 
monitored the machinery).  This intuitive link does not invariably hold true.  High value 
added production can be undertaken by predominantly low skilled employees and low 
cost production by highly skilled workers (Ashton and Sung 2006).  Aldi, the discount 
supermarket chain, employs comparatively few members of staff for the number of 
customers it serves but provides high levels of training and above average wages.  By 
contrast Hannon (2005), in his study of the Irish dairy industry observes how some firms 
dramatically upgraded production but still kept tight control over work processes, 
ensuring that skill levels remained low. 
 
Another much cited predictor of training levels is change at work and the introduction of 
new working practices since workers need to familiarise themselves with new 
procedures, technologies and ways of working (Ashton and Sung 2006; Leigh and 
Gifford 1999; Lynch and Black 1998; Frazis, Gittleman and Joyce 2000).  With training 
particularly high in organisations that introduced bundles of human resource practices 
such as ‘lean production’ or ‘high performance work systems’ (Whitfield 2000).  But 
again, while all these elements are positively linked with higher levels of training they are 
not deterministic.  Firms can and do introduce new management practices without linking 
these to employee training,  
 
It may be that these, and other, choices are inextricably intertwined with the way 
organisations choose to treat their employees, as dependable or disposable.  
Interchangeable unskilled labourers are likely to be engaged on very different types of 
 21 
work and have very different expectations of skill formation to trusted expert workers.  
As numerous studies note, higher levels of training are associated with higher than 
average salaries, generous fringe benefits, internal labour markets and promotions based 
on seniority (Fairris 2004; Frazis et al. 2000; Arthur 1999).  These are generally 
explained by the fact that well-treated employees are more likely to stay with their 
employer, reducing the risk that training investments will be lost to rival firms.  But, as 
Keep and Mayhew (1996) note, the causality is rather more complex than this as 
investments in skills and training may also justify others in sophisticated human resource 
practices, as workers contribute more to production and perks are devised to reward 
status. 
 
Trade unions and skill formation within firms 
 
There is also, particularly given this book’s focus, another area over which firms make 
choices and which can significantly impact on skill formation and that is the role of trade 
unions.  In Japan, Germany and Denmark unions’ roles are institutionalised.  Indeed, it is 
their co-operation which makes skill formation effective in each of these three nations.  
There is extensive consultation with establishment level unions in Japan and high levels 
of consensus and security in large firms; in Germany unions underpin sectoral 
bargaining, collaborate on the design and implementation of apprenticeships and 
contribute to workplace decision making through local representation and works 
councils; while in Denmark unions bring together workplace interests from numerous 
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small and medium sized enterprises.  Elsewhere, where unions are not automatically 
involved in the skill formation process, their role is more debateable. 
 
In theory, unions can impact on skill formation and training in a number of ways.  On the 
negative side they may reduce workplace flexibility, increase pay levels or distort the 
premia available for skills and so make it less viable, or less attractive, for employers to 
fund training.  On the positive, they may increase workers’ security, raising morale and 
commitment and so make training more attractive for employers (by reducing employee 
turnover and safeguarding investments in skill development), actively bargain with 
employers for skills, support skill formation practices such as apprenticeships and work 
with employers to justify higher wages via productivity improvements.  According to 
Stevens (1996), higher wages may also bring advantages to firms because they stimulate 
productivity gains and productivity gains made through training (see, for example Zwick 
2006) are likely to rise faster than wages. 
 
So much then for the theory, what of the evidence?  This is rather more mixed and there 
are distinct differences between the US and the British evidence.  Several US studies 
have revealed positive links between trade unions and training.  Parker’s (1997) historical 
analysis of Milwaukee reveals how co-operation with trade unions made its successful 
adoption of the German apprenticeship possible between 1911 and 1933 (attempts to 
introduce apprenticeships into unorganised industries and areas met with repeated 
failure).  More recently, Bilginsoy’s (2003) research into apprenticeships in the 
construction industry show dramatically higher success rates in schemes funded by both 
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unions and employers than those run by employers alone (58 per cent as opposed to 30 
per cent) and this despite the fact that the joint programmes had significantly higher 
numbers of women and minority candidates who are less likely to complete their 
apprenticeships (see also Berik and Bilginsoy 2000).  Elsewhere however the evidence is 
rather more mixed.  Shibata (1999) contrasts the reluctance of unions in the US to let 
front-line workers acquire skills in basic maintenance (for fear that specialist 
maintenance workers would be laid off) with the attitude of Japanese unions (in matched 
plants), who had no such fears.  While surveys have variously reported positive (Lynch 
1992), insignificant (Lynch and Black 1998; Knoke and Kalleberg 1994) and negative 
(Frazis et al. 2000) correlations between union presence and training levels. 
 
In Britain the link between trade union recognition and training is both more consistent 
and more positive.  Here, repeated studies reveal a strong, positive association with both 
the amount and the intensity of training (Boheim and Booth 2004; Green, Machin and 
Wilkinson 1999b; Booth, Francesconi and Zoega 2003).  Not only are workers in 
unionised workplaces more likely to receive training (and to receive more training) than 
their non-unionised peers, they are also more likely to be rewarded for this in the form of 
greater returns to training and higher wages (Booth et al. 2003).  The reasons for this 
seem to be less that unions bargain over training or implement training schemes 
themselves (they do, but on a comparatively small scale) and more, as Green et al. 
(1999b) note, to do with the general environment for employee relations in these firms. 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
 
These various and varying systems each boast very different advantages and 
disadvantages.  The flexibility of the market allows firms to respond quickly to changing 
needs and may provide a stimulus for them to support the development of a ‘skills elite’ 
but it is also far more likely to be the reason for a problem in skill formation than the 
means of its solution.  Organisations that compete against one another may save training 
costs by free-riding on the investments of their competitors and poaching skilled workers.  
But one of the consequences of this for the economy as a whole is that the workforce is 
likely to be under-trained since few employers will wish to risk their funds in developing 
skills (Bosch 2004) and employers are likely to suffer from the problems of skills 
shortages and skills gaps (Hillage et al. 2002).  This also creates problems for employees 
since poaching makes skill premia unpredictable so their investments of time or money 
may be at risk and, in the absence of training and development, unskilled work is rarely 
well paid, more likely to be casual or temporary and may not be linked to the sort of 
career ladders which could improve both work and life chances (Green 2006). 
 
By contrast, the consensus required for regulated systems makes institutions less 
responsive to the needs of individual employers (firms in Sweden complained repeatedly 
but without success, at the start of the 1990s that the vocational training system needed to 
be adapted to the shifts in technology and the market, Crouch, 2005).  But they are far 
more successful in providing high-quality, vocationally-relevant skills for the majority of 
the working population.  This allows firms to compete on the basis of quality goods, 
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innovation or incremental customisation; earning more in both domestic and international 
markets.  Individual workers are more productive and are paid more, which improves 
their standard of living and has positive implications for society (Lloyd and Payne 2003, 
2004; Brown 2001b). 
 
It seems that, following Finegold and Soskice (1988), systems of skill formation may 
help to create ‘path dependencies’ which either enable nations to compete on the basis of 
skills and knowledge or restrict them to low-wage, low-skill markets.  Small wonder then 
that the consensus among commentators was that some form of intervention was needed 
in national VET systems and that it was the role of the state to intervene through 
regulation, by supporting tertiary bodies of employer and employee associations, by 
developing and insisting on occupational qualifications or by supporting skills directly, to 
ensure that workers acquired skills (Crouch et al. 1999).  Yet recently this consensus has 
been challenged, not because of flaws in the various systems of skill formation but 
because increasingly integrated national economies may make individual divergence less 
viable and because the dramatic changes in technology and labour markets since the start 
of the 1990s may make formal systems of VET, which rely on stability and a consensus 
over which skills are needed and will be rewarded in the future, much less relevant. 
 
Let us examine these two challenges.  Surprisingly perhaps globalisation seems to be the 
lesser one.  Economies are connecting and international trade is growing (although this is 
not a new phenomenon) but different institutional frameworks mean that national 
economies develop very distinctive capabilities, competing in different sectors and with 
 26 
different technologies (Whitley 2003).  As Whitley (1999) notes, they are effectively 
competing by differentiating their goods, rather than by harmonising practice against 
some universal template.  Even multi-national companies, which might be expected to be 
the harbingers of shared practice generally remain rooted in their own national and 
cultural systems (Bradley et al. 2000), while employment practices are adapted to local 
circumstances (Edwards and Ferner 2002; Ferner and Varul 2000a, 2000b; Ramirez and 
Mabey 2005).  Markets are social as well as economic institutions and firms may shape 
the markets they are in as much as they respond to them (Djelic, Nooteboom and Whitley 
2005).  As the descriptions of the various systems in this chapter has shown, differences 
are embedded in competition and are far more deeply rooted than simply divergent 
approaches to the same goal. 
 
Set against this however, several of the regulated economies are struggling.  The 
Japanese economy has been in a prolonged slump for more than a decade while Germany 
is beset by high levels of unemployment (Federal Statistical Office 2005).  Commentators 
vary in their reactions to this, and particularly in their predictions for the future health of 
the German regulated system.  None blame the country’s ills on its skill formation 
practices but there are queries over whether, after the expenses and economic ills of 
unification, these are sustainable.  According to Crouch (2005) “many” employers are 
trying to free themselves from the costly VET system and French’s (2000) study of IG 
Metall reveals how the firm’s activities in old East German are effectively creating a dual 
market, undermining the whole system of collective bargaining.  Yet elsewhere in East 
Germany, Culpepper (1999) notes how few firms are attempting to introduce low-wage 
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or numerically flexible forms of labour (see also Bluhm 2001).  It may be that the service 
sector presents a greater danger here than unification.  In the retail sector the old model of 
apprentice-trained assistants is being abandoned in favour of small numbers of key, 
functionally flexible ‘anchor’ workers who support larger numbers of lower paid, 
numerically flexible employees (Kirsch et al. 2000), while in hotels the highly skilled and 
multi-lingual qualified German employees are set against poorly paid East European 
domestics (Finegold et al. 2000). 
 
Despite some claims (Sloane and Ertl 2003) demand for apprenticeships by young people 
is still strong (and falls only slightly short of record-breaking levels) although the 
majority of East German trainees are on schemes subsidised by the state, which raises 
questions about employer commitment to co-funding (Culpepper 1999).  Encouragingly 
too the system for designing apprenticeships is becoming more adept at responding to 
change and technological innovation.  In the past Germany certainly struggled to provide 
qualifications for developing industries such as ICT since the tri-partite arrangements for 
agreeing standards were so time consuming that qualifications in fast developing fields 
were out of date before they were launched.  However, this development process has 
been considerably shortened and the dominance and longevity of systems like Microsoft 
mean that computing skills that do not date rapidly can be supported (Bosch 2003).  Four 
new technical apprenticeships were launched in 1997 and proved so popular that, even in 
work with no tradition of apprenticeships 60,000 young people were in training by the 
end of 2001, and this figure was in addition to the 10,000 apprentices enrolled on the 
‘old’ ICT apprenticeship (Steedman, Wagner and Foreman 2003:13). 
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By contrast, in the Anglo-American labour markets, where efforts have been put into 
reducing regulation and the focus is on numerically flexible workers (often employed on 
temporary or part-time contracts) job growth is healthy and unemployment low.  It seems 
that skills-based competition no longer secures economic advantage. 
 
Yet what such accounts neglect is the quality of the jobs that are available.  Some years 
ago The Economist, a publication known for its support of deregulated labour (and other) 
markets greeted the news that 10,000 new jobs had been created in the USA by 
publishing a joke that noted “you need three of them to live”.  As Green (2006) points 
out, in the USA, alone among the developed world, real wages have declined over the last 
twenty years (elsewhere they have more than doubled).  In Britain part-time work, 
undertaken predominantly by women working in the service sector, is significantly less 
well paid than its full time equivalent and part-time workers generally have little access 
to career ladders or job-related training.  When an economy is dominated by such jobs it 
may be trapped in a ‘low-skills equilibrium’ where the existence of low-skilled, low paid 
labour creates a demand for low priced products which themselves create a demand for 
low-skilled labour (Finegold and Soskice 1988).  Nor is there any evidence that future job 
generation will restrict the numbers of such undesirable jobs.  As Brown, P. (2001b) 
notes, sweatshops have been observed again in the USA, moreover the existence of so 
many part-time workers provides a considerable economic advantage.  Most of the new 
jobs being created are confined to front-line service work and characterised by low skill, 
low pay and low prospects (see, for example Nolan and Slater 2003).  There is no 
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requirement for these jobs to be poorly paid.  In Sweden many person-to-person care 
services are undertaken by the public sector and workers enjoy reasonable earnings and 
good terms and conditions (Esping-Andersen 1999).  In opting for high numbers of badly 
paid jobs in the private sector employers and their governing states have noted the trade-
off between skill and employment and embarked on the low road to prosperity (Crouch et 
al. 1999; Maurin and Postel-Vinay 2005; Ebbinghaus and Kittel 2005). 
 
Any contrast between economies cannot be reduced to a simple headcount between the 
numbers employed or unemployed (although such headline figures are important).  It is 
also significant that US firms pay low wages, provide few forms of social protection, 
invest little in skills and cope with high levels of employee turnover while their German 
counterparts treat workers very differently. 
 
It may be more worrying to consider areas of job growth and skills change.  As noted 
above, some of the most problematic developments for the German system can be 
observed in the service sector where long traditions of high skill, high quality and 
responsible autonomy are being abandoned in favour of low skill and direct control.  This 
area has been the site of most dramatic job growth in recent years and in the USA more 
people are now employed by McDonald’s than US Steel (Macdonald and Sirianni 1996).  
At the same time, manufacturing has been in decline, effectively, as Crouch (2005) 
observes, removing a major source of stable, middle skill occupations.  Since many 
existing skill formation systems thrive on the stability of sectors, and many successful 
programmes are sited in manufacturing this may cause problems. 
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The model of skills development proposed by Crouch (2005) in response to this seems 
more of a problem than a solution.  When no-one knows what skills are likely to be 
needed in the future because demand has become much more unpredictable, the absence 
of provision that effectively characterises both of these economies and the tendency of 
their governments to defer responsibility for skills acquisition to the young people 
entering the labour market (who need to be flexible and to ‘learn to learn’) means that 
many workers will be attempting to acquire skills and that some will succeed in acquiring 
the ‘right’ ones (whatever these turn out to be).  He acknowledges that such a system is 
wasteful.  While some workers will succeed in this blindfold game of the survival of the 
fittest many will not and since those who fail to guess correctly may have education but 
few vocationally relevant skills he suggests that their alternative source of employment is 
the unskilled part of the service sector, work that is likely to prove alienating and 
unfulfilling. 
 
Worryingly though it is these free-market approaches that seem to be being taken up by 
many rapidly developing economies.  Russia’s new market economy relies almost 
entirely on old Soviet-era skills or the vocational training carried out in what remains of 
the public sector.  In the private sector poaching is the most widely used substitute for 
training, although some firms do hire highly educated graduates in the hope that they may 
be able to learn what is necessary on the job.  On the rare occasions that training is 
provided it is seen as a privilege of rank, rather than a activity required to do work well, 
so those with high status in the firm may be sent on courses, regardless of whether they 
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can benefit from them.  One knitwear firm in Kemerovo got a new computerised knitting 
machine but sent the designer rather than the operator to be trained in how to use it, so 
were never able to deploy it to full capacity (Clarke and Metalina 2000).  Even in 
Hungary, which has attempted to support a gentle transition from a managed economy to 
capitalism, most up-grading of production and up-skilling of the workforce is observable 
in the foreign owned firms.  While Korea, although heavily influenced by the Japanese 
system in other ways, is heavily dependent on cheap, unskilled labour and firms provide 
little VET and very limited access to career ladders for these workers (Whitley 1999).  It 
seems unlikely that this is the result of free choice or due consideration over which skill 
formation system is most effective.  Rather, the absence of strong intermediary bodies 
(including trade unions, professional bodies or employers’ associations) and limited 
resources drive both firms and nations towards a laissez faire free market approach. 
 
To some extent, this is simply a new gloss on an old problem.  The dilemma of providing 
skills remains and, for the majority, it is likely that market systems will fail (there have 
always been a minority who have succeeded under these conditions).  The rapid changes 
in technology, in skills required and the eternal impossibility of predicting the future may 
make the skills dilemma less easy to resolve than in times when policymakers and 
employers could assert with confidence what industry’s requirements would be in twenty 
years time, but they do not change the fact that the skills available in the labour force are 
a major influence on the way companies use labour nor that markets can be and are 
constantly actively shaped.  It may well be that in nations and sectors where young 
people are equipped with skills they will have to re-learn them or acquire new ones in the 
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course of their careers but it is surely better to provide skills and decent jobs to go with 
these expectations of flexibility than to abandon the labour market entrants to their fate.  
As experience in Japan shows, skilled workers are not necessarily inflexible and gaining 
new skills may add to their abilities and capacity to problem solve.  Whichever 
predictions on the future of the labour market prove correct it seems unlikely that skill 
formation systems will converge in the future. 
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